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Financial derivatives are important hedging tool for asset’s manager. Electricity is by its very 
nature the most volatile commodity, which creates big incentive to share the risk among the 
market  participants  through  financial  contracts.  But,  even  if  volume  of  derivatives  contracts 
traded on Power Exchanges has been growing since the beginning of the restructuring of the 
sector, electricity markets continue to be considerably less liquid than other commodities. This 
paper tries to quantify the effect of this insufficient liquidity on power exchange, by introducing a 
pricing equilibrium model for power derivatives where agents can not hedge up to their desired 
level. Mathematically, the problem is a two stage stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium and its 
solution is not unique. Computing a large panel of solutions, we show how the risk premium and 
player’s profit are affected by the illiquidity. 
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Liquidity plays a crucial role in ﬁnancial markets. It enlarges the capacity of the mar-
ket to accommodate order ﬂows and guarantees the ability to quickly buy/sell suﬃcient
quantities of an asset without signiﬁcantly impacting the price. Liquidity is among the
most important characteristics for asset managers who want to be sure that their port-
folio can easily be converted into cash. Insuﬃcient liquidity, on the other hand, creates
new risks and frictions. The literature provides ample empirical evidence that liquidity is
an important state variable for asset pricing and that investors demand a higher return
from less liquid securities (see P` astor and Stambaugh (2002); Amihud (2002) and the
cited literature).
Two important issues arise from insuﬃcient liquidity. The ﬁrst one is the empirical
proxy that is used to measure it. Liquidity is an unobserved variable that embeds sev-
eral dimensions, as volume, depth, resiliency and tightness1. The simplest proxies are the
volume of exchange and the bid-ask spread; but it is now recognized that those measures
are not fully appropriate. Many other measures, which relate the size of the trade to the
size of the price movement, have been proposed and explored. Hasbrouck (2005) provides
a comprehensive discussion of some interesting measures. The second issue concerns the
eﬀect of insuﬃcient liquidity on the pricing of ﬁnancial contracts. Indeed, most pricing
models rely on the assumption of absence of arbitrage. This assumption is only sustain-
able in a very liquid market where arbitrageurs can instantaneously exploit all possible
mispricings. This does not hold for illiquid markets and hence such models might not be
applicable.
Power derivatives are important in restructured electricity markets because they per-
mit agents (producers, distributors, retailers) to hedge their strategy in a quite volatile
environment. There was substantial evidence of insuﬃcient liquidity in the early days of
the restructured electricity markets(Newbery et al. (2003) and Newbery (2004)). Since
then, the volume of spot and derivatives contracts increased signiﬁcantly but electricity
1for deﬁnitions of those concepts, see among O’Hara (1997); Kyle (1985)
2still remains considerably less liquid than other energy commodities (Table 8). Nowadays,
market operators or power exchanges regularly publish technical reports on the trade vol-
umes and number of active participants (e.g. Market Surveillance of EEX (2009)). But,
to our knowledge, no empirical study has really focused on the eﬀects of a possible insuf-
ﬁcient liquidity on the derivatives contracts. PJM (2007) recognizes that mature energy
markets will require increased forward trading in order to reduce risk and provide clear
price signals to support investment and hedging opportunities.
The pricing of ﬁnancial power derivatives remains a challenging topic, even regardless
of liquidity problems. It is well recognized that the non-storability of electricity creates
non-hedgeable risks2. Also the time series of the underlying spot prices exhibit unusual
behaviors due to the idiosyncrasies of electricity. The demand of electricity is variable,
stochastic and price inelastic in the short term. These properties combined with the
ﬁnite capacity and technical characteristics of generators implies a particular spot price
dynamics that spikes to extremely high values. These jumps usually occur within a very
short period of time. Also, time series of power prices exhibit substantial mean reversion
and seasonality. Last but not least, the market is impacted by a very wide set of param-
eters, such as the fuel prices, power plants availability and network capacity.
Because of this complexity, researchers have developed so-called equilibrium-based
model with the goal of understanding the fundamentals of the power derivatives mar-
ket. The pioneering paper of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) analyzes the forward
market by assuming that the prices are determined by an economic equilibrium among
market participants (producers and retailers) rather than by speculation mechanisms.
The authors assume that market agents are risk-averse and hedge their stochastic proﬁt
by optimizing their positions in ﬁnancial contracts. This equilibrium model derives the
optimal strategies of these agents on the basis of their incentives to hedge. This leads to
the necessary volume of power derivatives at the equilibrium. Bessembinder and Lem-
mon (2002) ﬁnd optimal hedge ratio3 roughly ranging from 0.8 to 1.2, depending on
2One cannot buy power on the spot (day-ahead) market, store it and re-sell it later.
3the hedge ratio is the ratio between the volume of future contracts and the expected production
3the market parameters. Producers and retailers massively buy/sell ﬁnancial contracts in
order to minimize their risks. All studies based on this type of methodology conclude to
similar quantitative results. Such level of trades have never been observed on any power
exchange. Due to lack of liquidity, agents can not hedge their production and demand
at those levels.
The goal of this paper is to illustrate and quantify the eﬀect of illiquidity in the power
exchange on power derivatives. To our knowledge this problem has not been explored
before. We construct a two stage stochastic equilibrium model of power derivatives in
a perfect competition market (agents are price takers) except for insuﬃcient liquidity.
We deﬁne liquidity on the basis of the volume exchanged and study its impact by re-
stricting the volume of available derivative contracts. In this set up agents can not hedge
up to their desired level because their strategy sets are restricted by the action of the
others players. Mathematically, the problem is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
(GNEP) and its solution is not anymore unique. We illustrate the model on a 6-node
example taken from Chao and Peck (1998) and quantify the eﬀect of illiquidity by com-
puting a large panel of equilibria and discussing their signiﬁcance. The model involves
both generation and transmission markets. Empirical studies (Siddiqui et al. (2005);
Adamson and Englander (2005)) have yet pointed that the risk premia on transmission
contracts are unreasonably important and that the low liquidity of Financial Transmis-
sion Rights (FTRs) markets is one principal explanation. Shijie et al. (2005) shows that
certain market design, as the simultaneous feasibility rules, are also a plausible explana-
tion. This paper studies the impact of illiquidity in one market (here transmission rights)
on the other market (here energy).
The paper is organized as follow. We select a market design in section 2 and present
the corresponding model of the spot market. In section 3, we focus on equilibrium pric-
ing model in a perfect liquid market and cast the notion of absence of arbitrage in this
context. We show that a suﬃcient condition for eliminating arbitrage at equilibrium in
a perfect liquid market is to model the risk aversion by coherent (in the sense of Artzner
et al. (1999)) and ”equivalent” valuation function. In section 4, we quantify the impact
4of insuﬃcient liquidity in power market. We present our model and address speciﬁcally
three topics arising from illiquidity. We ﬁrst show that illiquidity allows for remaining
arbitrage possibilities at equilibrium. Secondly, we analyze a range of equilibria with
the view of quantifying the eﬀect of illiquidity on the agents hedging strategies, proﬁts
volatility and risk-premia. Finally, we focus our attention on illiquidity in the market of
ﬁnancial transmission rights (FTRs) and show that illiquidity in one market (in this case
transmission) can drastically decrease the incentive to hedge in an other market (here
energy). We conclude in section 5.
2. Spot market equilibrium
2.1. Selecting a Market Design
The restructuring of electricity market has lead to many, sometimes quite diﬀerent,
market designs. Following several authors, we here focus on a particular design where a
day-ahead market trades power for physical delivery on a spot market taking place the
next day. The spot market is based on an hourly auction with bids for purchase and
sale. This market is segmented geographically, and divided in several nodes of supply
or demand connected by transmission lines. Congestion management is a key element
in restructured electricity markets. The prices are deﬁned at each node of the network
reﬂecting that only feasible bids, i.e. bids that comply with the limited capacity of the
network, can be accepted at diﬀerent nodes. The nodal prices are called Locational
Based Marginal Prices (LBMP) and are calculated for each generation and load zone by
the System Operator (SO). In such system, the buyers pay the LBMP calculated at the
node in which they take delivery of electricity (or point of withdrawal :PoW) and sellers
receive the LBMP at the bus to which they supply (or point of injection :PoI).
This organization can be seen as an extremely stylized view of restructured US power
markets. The market design in EU countries is diﬀerent where the most advanced real-
ization is still based on a separation between energy and transmission markets. Prices
are not deﬁned at each bus but within a zone, which usually corresponds to the coun-
try/market. Congestion management is treated after the clearing of the energy market.
5The Power Exchanges that clear the energy market may ﬁrst accept bids that are not
feasible for the transmission network. It is then up to the Transmission System Oper-
ators to correct the situation by redispatching and counter-trading operations. Usually
an asymmetric reward scheme is applied. The production units that are constrained oﬀ
still receive the remuneration from the energy market at the calculated spot price. The
production units that are constrained on obtain a price equal to their bids in the spot
market. While this procedure permits a price that is deﬁned at a national level, it intro-
duces several ineﬃciencies. The adjustment creates extra cost that are supported by the
SO and pass through to the consumer after socialization. There is evidence (Ehrenmann
and Smeers (2004); Furi´ o and Lucia (2009)) that it creates undesired incentives to game
the system and changes the trading strategies of market participants4.
2.2. The spot market model
We develop our analysis on an extremely stylized US like market because the integra-
tion of energy and transmission makes congestion management more transparent. This
integration of the energy and transmission operations also facilitates the quantiﬁcation
of liquidity constraints on ﬁnancial transmission contracts 5. We assume a perfectly com-
petitive spot electricity market. Stylized examples are widely used in the literature since
Hogan (1992)’s famous three nodes network. We follow suit and construct our arguments
on Chao and Peck (1998)’s six nodes example (Figure 1). We adopt both the model and
its numerical assumptions (see the original article for more discussion of that example).
Our description of the market is now standard. The power grid contains N buses and
L transmission lines. Each line ￿ ∈ L is characterized by its impedance and has a thermal
capacity K￿. Using the DC approximation of the AC load ﬂow equations, every MW
injected (retrieved) at a generating (load) bus n is responsible for a power ﬂow PTDFn,￿
4Furi´ o and Lucia (2009) show on the Spanish market that buyers respond by abandoning the daily
market in favor on the intraday as far as possible. In the seller’s part, their paper concludes that some
strategical power plants have incentives to submit their sales bids at high prices in order to not be
matched in the spot market but ﬁnally are required to produce to solve the transmission constraints.
5In Europe, there exist no FTRs deﬁned at a national level, but on some cross-border interconnectors
(obtained by the so-called explicit auctions). Those explicit auctions are less important for the hedging
and also have the bad property that they do not ensure that the ow always goes from low price area to
the high price area (see Kristiansen (2007))
6Figure 1: 6-nodes network (Chao and Peck (1998))
on the line ￿ ∈ L. The electrical network is controlled by a SO which is responsible for
its reliability. At each bus of the network, there is a single economic agent ν ∈ N which
can be a producer (ν ∈ Np) or a retailer (ν ∈ Nr). Producer have unlimited capacities;
they bid their marginal cost of supply Cν in the spot market. We assume furthermore
that the producer has no ﬁxed cost and its total cost function CT
ν takes the following
form6.
CT




; Cν(qν)=aν + bνqν (1)
Each retailer ν ∈ Nr serves the ﬁnal consumers at its bus. It sells power at a ﬁxed
retail price Pr
ν. It bids its inverse demand function in the spot market which is also
assumed to be linear7.
Pν(qν)=aν − bνqν (2)
Table (1) reports the bids of the diﬀerent economic agents.
6The model can easily be extended to more complex production function and production set restricted
by a limited capacity.
7One can easily extend the model to inelastic demand, which is probably a better representation of
actual markets. The computation of the spot equilibrium by maximizing the welfare becomes then the
minimization of the total cost for meeting the inelastic demand.
7Bus-ID Supply bids: Cν(qν)
1 10 + 0.05 q
2 15 + 0.05 q
4 42.5 + 0.025 q
Bus-ID Load bids: Pν(qν) Pr
ν
3 37.5 - 0.05 q 33.6
5 75 - 0.1 q 61.7
6 80 - 0.1 q 62.6
Table 1: The 6-nodes example
The System Operator collects the bids in the spot market and maximizes the total

























PTDFν,￿ qν ≤ K￿
(3)
The spot price Ps
ν at each node ν is given by the marginal cost at a generating bus,
or by the inverse demand function at a load bus. The SO earns a spot proﬁt πspot
so (t h e








In this expression, tr￿ is the power ﬂow on the line ￿. It can be derived from the in-
jections/withdrawals qν and the power distribution factor of the line. (Ps
￿2 − Ps
￿1)i st h e
diﬀerence of prices at the end nodes of line ￿. The proﬁts of producers/retailers on the








ν (qν)) if ν ∈ Np
qν(Pr
ν − Ps
ν)i f ν ∈ Nr
(5)
82.3. Uncertainty and spot scenarios
We consider two types of uncertainties on the spot market. One is the ﬁnal consumer
demand which is particularly sensitive to weather variation. We model this uncertainty
by a set of independent scenarios for the parameters aν of the load buses. Speciﬁcally
the load parameters aν varies from -25% to +25% (by step of 12.5%). So, a retailer faces
the stochastic demand of its ﬁnal consumers. In the short term, the retail price Pr
ν is
ﬁxed. It is here set to 120% of the expected node price at which the retailer serves its
clients. The network availability is the second source of uncertainty. Transmission line
outages can seriously impact the spot equilibrium. We consider 2 contingencies: the no
default case occurs with probability of 90%. The outage of the line linking nodes 1 and
6 occurs with a probability of 10%. This leads to a total of 250 scenarios. We let ω
and pω denoting a scenario and its probability. Solving the equilibrium of the spot mar-
ket for the diﬀerent scenarios we obtain the distribution of results summarized in Table 2.
































1517 702 -83 86 78 -309
Table 2: Nodal price and agents proﬁt statistics
E and Var in the table respectively denote expectation and variance. The statistic
”vol” measures the volatility of the proﬁt; it is the ratio between the expectation and the
standard deviation. The conditional value at risk CVaRα is another risk measure that
represents the expected proﬁt computed over the (1 − α) worst scenarios. While less
extensively used than the Value at Risk (VaR), the CVaR is more and more commonly
encountered in the literature. Figure (2) where the shaded area measures the CVaR
illustrates the concept.
9Figure 2: Illustration of the CVaR
Table 2 shows that retailer proﬁts are much more volatile than those of the producers.
More importantly, their CVaR75% (i.e. the conditional expectation of their proﬁt in the
63 worst scenarios) are very low compared to the expected proﬁts; they are even negative
for retailers at bus 3 and 6. The system operator collects the merchandising surplus on
transmission lines (see Table 9 in appendix A). The revenue accruing from operating a
line depends on the price diﬀerence at its two extremity buses. In our numerical simula-
tion, the line prices are more volatile than the nodal prices, reﬂecting the fact that the
demand in the three load buses are independent. Table 9 also shows the ﬁrst and the
second moments of those prices. Not surprisingly, the transmission price between the
node 1 and node 6 is the most expensive and the most volatile, because those two nodes
are linked by a transmission line subject to outages.
3. Equilibrium pricing for ﬁnancial contracts
The literature oﬀers two main methodologies for pricing derivative products. One
approach resorts to risk neutral valuation and constitutes the most common approach
in ﬁnancial mathematics. It is based on stochastic process models that capture the spot
price dynamics and serve to value power contingent claims. The other stream of the lit-
erature relies on economic models of power production and consumption. Bessembinder
and Lemmon (2002) were the ﬁrst to introduce a two stage equilibrium model of the
power future market where market participants want to hedge their proﬁt by contract-
ing a certain amount of futures before bidding in the spot market. Their methodology
10has subsequently been used by several authors. Cavallo and Termini (2005) study the
beneﬁts of introducing a market for standardized derivatives. Notably, they showed that
this market increases the share of the electricity purchased through the spot market and
diminishes the share of the bilateral contracts. Willems and Morbee (2008) quantify
how the introduction of power derivatives aﬀects welfare and investment incentives .
Their computational results indicate that aggregate welfare in the market increases with
the number of derivatives oﬀered and that investment decisions improve with increasing
market completeness because of decoupling of investment and speculation. B¨ ulher and
M¨ uller-Merbach (2008) extend the initial model of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002)
to a dynamic equilibrium and derive an endogenous term structure of electricity futures
prices. Our model is part of this latter stream of literature.
By participating in the ﬁnancial market, producers and retailers trade the risks in-
curred because of ﬂuctuating spot prices, demand shocks and network congestion. They
have the opportunity to contract diﬀerent ﬁnancial derivatives (noted c), whose pay-oﬀ
is the diﬀerence between the derivative price Pf
c and the corresponding realized pay-oﬀ
Ps
c,ω (which is a known function of the spot market price). Letting xν
c be the position of
agent ν in contract c, the proﬁt formula (equations 4 and 5) of agents (retailer, generators
and SO) become :
Πν,ω =

   


























Agents are price takers in a perfectly competitive market. They can inﬂuence neither
the spot price, nor the price of the ﬁnancial contract Ps
c,ω in order to earn extra proﬁt
from the trading. The outcome of the spot market is thus independent of the ﬁnancial
portfolios of agents. One can ﬁrst solve the equilibrium of the spot market and then
solve the equilibrium of the forward market on the basis of the obtained spot prices equi-
11libria. Notice that this simpliﬁcation does not hold in a non-competitive environment
because forward decisions can inﬂuence the outcome of the spot market. Zhang et al.
(2009) propose a stochastic equilibrium model with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) to
characterize the interaction between the two markets in a Cournot game.
Agents trade ﬁnancial contracts because they are risk averse and want to hedge the
random proﬁt earned in the spot market. We model this risk aversion by using the modern
approach of risk valuation (see Artzner et al. (1999) for the original risk measure concepts
and Shapiro et al. (2009) for their inclusion in a mathematical programming framework).
The original presentation is in terms of risk function8 ; because of the context we conduct
the discussion in terms of risk valuation. A risk valuation is a function ρ which maps
the space of risky payoﬀs (i.e. the set of all possible real-valued functions on Ω) into
the extended real line ¯ R9. Investor ν values his total portfolio according to the risk-
valuation of its outcomes distribution, let ρν(Πν)10. The problem of investor (producer





where Πν,ω is given by equation 6.
The SO problem is slightly more complicated and is presented latter.
3.1. Risk valuation and arbitrage
Equilibrium pricing models are not based on the assumption of absence of arbitrage
but rather suppose that prices are determined by the economic equilibrium resulting from
the simultaneous maximization of agents risk valuation. If this equilibrium contains ar-
bitrage opportunities, outside speculators in a perfect liquid market will massively enter
the market and trade them away. We do not model these speculators (as explained
above, we exclude them from the transmission market) and hence cannot ex ante guar-
antee an arbitrage free equilibrium. It is however possible to guarantee the absence of
8in the context of minimization of loss.
9¯ R = R ∪{ +∞} ∪ {−∞}

















12arbitrage at equilibrium by assuming that agents risk aversion is modeled by ”coherent”
and ”equivalent” risk valuation. By deﬁnition ”coherence” means that the risk valuation
satisﬁes axioms respectively noted concavity, monotonicity, translation equivariance and
positive homogeneity (see deﬁnitions in appendix B). A ”representation theorem” (see
Artzner et al. (1999)) states that every coherent risk valuation ρ can be represented as
an expectation taken with respect to the probability measure ζdP,w h e r eζ belongs to
the subdiﬀerential of ρ at 0.
ρν(Πν)= i n f
ζν∈∂ρ(0)
Eζν[Πν] (8)
”Equivalence” means that the probability measure associated with the risk measure (i.e.
of density ζdP) is equivalent to the measure dP, that is, that both have the same set of
zero measure events.
When the market is perfect (i.e. no transaction cost or portfolio restriction), Pν
optimality condition implies that there exists a (at least one) probability measure, deﬁned
by ζ∗
νdP, under which prices are discounted martingales. In case of futures contracts,





According to the ﬁrst theorem of ﬁnance, if this probability measure ζ∗
νdP is equivalent
to the true one, then the market is arbitrage free. We call the probability measure ζ∗
νdP
the agent’s risk neutral measure; it depends on the assumed risk valuation function and
the proﬁt distribution of the agent. The probability measures ζ∗
νdP are identical among
all players when the market is complete. Also, ﬁnancially speaking, the density ζ∗
ν can
be interpreted as the ”agent’s state prices” at equilibrium, i.e. how much a particular
agent values one unit of extra proﬁt which only occurs for a particular state.
An equilibrium model where agents risk aversion is modeled with a non coherent
risk valuation might lead to solution with arbitrage opportunities. For example, mean-
variance, as used in Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) or Willems and Morbee (2008), is
not coherent because it violates the positive homogeneity and monotonicity axioms. The
13absence of arbitrage in the equilibrium solution can be checked ex-post, by verifying if
the prices of the derivatives are strictly inside the convex hull of the spot payoﬀs of these
derivatives (in which case they can be expressed as expectations of the spot pay-oﬀs in
some risk-neutral probability measures). The CVaR, which is growing in popularity in
the literature on electricity restructuring11 , is a coherent risk valuation but does not lead
to equivalent measures. Indeed, CVaRα is an expectation under a probability measure
which disregards proﬁts greater than some threshold level that is only exceeded α of the
time. So it can also lead to equilibrium solution with arbitrage opportunities.
We model the agents risk aversion by a E-CVaRα,β , which is a weighted sum of the
expectation of the proﬁt and a CVaRα.









This function satisﬁes the four axioms of coherence and is also equivalent. Indeed, the
associated agent’s state prices are :
∂(E-CVaR)(Πν)=

   






ζν,ω =( 1− β)+βα−1 if Πν,ω < VaRα(Πν)
ζν,ω =( 1− β)i f Π ν,ω > VaRα(Πν)
ζν,ω =( 1− β)+[ 0 ,βα −1]i fΠ ν,ω = VaRα(Πν)
One can see that the probability measure of density ζ∗
νdP is equivalent to the true one
and deﬁnes the risk-neutral measure for the agent. For our computations, we set the
parameters β to 0.9 and α to 20%.
3.2. The model
We consider two types of ﬁnancial derivatives. Energy futures are the most impor-
tant ones in terms of volume. An agent holding a long futures position receives the
diﬀerence between the energy spot price at maturity and the futures price. Forward
energy contracts do not exist for all nodes. Indeed, in order to enhance liquidity, en-
ergy futures markets are restricted to a few busses (the hubs). In order to allow agents
located at diﬀerent nodes to mitigate congestion charges between their home node and
11see among Bartelj et al. (2010); Resta and Santini (2008); Gonzalez et al. (2007)
14the hub, properly designed electricity markets implement periodic auctions of ﬁnancial
transmission right (FTRs). We therefore complement the 6-nodes spot market by assum-
ing forward energy and transmission trading where agents can trade energy futures and
point to hub FTRs contracts. We suppose that there is only one future energy contract
traded at node 6, which is the sole hub of the network. This situation is representative of
many U.S. market, where energy futures exist only for some hubs and not at each node
of the network. Considering node to hub FTRs contracts allows one to span all node to
node transmission risks.
The problem of producers and retailers was stated in (7). The description of the
behavior of the SO is slightly diﬀerent. The SO is the ultimate counter party in the
transmission market. The SO initially auctions FTR contracts but wants to restrict
their set to a volume that is adequate and reliable for its congestion management. It
limits the total amount of auctioned FTR so that the corresponding ﬂow on the lines
satisﬁes the N-1 rule12. Also, we assume that it does not take any futures energy position
on the hub (here node 6). The SO therefore sells FTR so as to maximize the risk valuation


















such that, for each agent xν
c solves Pν (relation (7)), xso
c solves Pso (relation (11)) for
given price of the derivatives contract Pf






The complete formulation of the equilibrium model is given in appendix C. It is a Nash
Equilibrium Problem (NEP); we show in this appendix how the problem can be solved
heuristically by a sequence of linear programming problems.
12That is must satisfy all the thermal lines limit under all singular lines outage.
153.3. Simulation results
Table 3 reports the prices and volumes13 of the diﬀerent derivatives at equilibrium.
Pf







is the risk premium embedded in the contract price. One ﬁrst observes
the high trade volume. The quantity of energy futures at node 6 amounts to 82% of
the expected spot quantities. One also observes that the contracts with the highest risk
premium are also the most traded ones on the market. Those contracts are actually the









FUTURE 6 53.5 0.45 564
FTR 1→6 28.9 0.58 462
FTR 2→6 27.4 0.55 696
FTR 3→6 25.53 0.55 359
FTR 4→6 7.59 0.46 242
FTR 5→6 1.57 -0.01 94
Table 3: Equilibrium prices, risk premium and volume of the derivatives contract
The beneﬁts of the derivative contracts for the players can be seen on table 4. The
volatility of the proﬁt decreases considerably compared to the situation with the full ex-
position to the spot market (compare to table 2). The CVaR75% are closer to the expected
proﬁts. Forward positions dramatically reduce the risk exposure of all agents with only
a small change in expected proﬁt. This percussive impact of the derivatives for hedging
is illustrated in the ﬁgure, by comparing the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the spot proﬁt (π
spot
6,ω ) and the proﬁt after hedging (Π6,ω) for the retailer located at the
node 6 (the hub).
These ﬁgures conﬁrm results precedingly obtained by various authors. The current
treatment adds to that literature by the introduction of a transmission market and the
13The volume refers to the total quantity of MW sold/bought on the market.













1 2198 1.8% 1517
2 1283 4.9% 1209
3 657 33% 329
4 349 17% 277
5 1602 49% 600
6 1890 48% 604
SO 11138 35% 6624
Table 4: Statistics of the market players total proﬁt and cdf14 for the retailer at node 6
use of a coherent and equivalent risk measure to guarantee the absence of arbitrage. This
establishes a link between our approach and the more standard risk neutral valuation.
4. Insuﬃcient Liquidity
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on contingent claim pricing in electricity
does not quantitatively discuss the eﬀect of illiquidity on derivative contracts. Similarly
pricing models in that literature do not include illiquidity as a state variable. This is
surprising as it is indeed sometimes noted that insuﬃcient liquidity can play a crucial
role in optimal management of a commodity portfolio (e.g. Geman and Ohana (2008)).
Indeed, while prices are commonly taken as exogenous variables in that literature15,t h e
positions in the portfolio are constrained by bounds that reﬂect the illiquidity. These
models implicitly assume that modifying the bounds to reﬂect illiquidity does not change
prices. Also, and as mentioned before, the literature of equilibrium models commonly
predicts high hedge ratio, even when agents are not very risk averse16.O u rm o d e l ,e v e n
though it uses a diﬀerent risk function, concludes similarly (Table 5). The problem is
15which assumption only holds surprisingly in very liquid market
16As mentioned previously, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) ﬁnd an optimal hedge ratio varying
from 0.8 to 1.2, depending on the market parameters. In Willems and Morbee (2008)’s computation,
the total optimal number of futures goes up to 68GW when the expected demand is only 60 GW.
17that volumes such as those predicted by equilibrium models have never been observed
on any power exchange.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Hedge ratio 0.92 0.82 0.26 0.63 0.6 1.4
Table 5: Market player’s future position divided by his expected spot quantity
Illiquidity constrains the strategies of the agents and makes these hedge positions
impossible : agents cannot hedge their proﬁt as they desire. We account for these preoc-
cupations by explicitly introducing constraints on hedging possibilities with the view of
assessing their impact on prices. We do so by imposing an upper bound on the volume





These constraints are shared by all players. In game parlance this implies that the set of
hedging strategies of a player is restricted by the hedging actions of the others(noted x−ν).























We assume that only producers and retailers face those liquidity bounds. The SO has a
diﬀerent liquidity problem as it issues ﬁnancial transmission rights subject to a feasibility
constraint (N-1 rule) . The formulation of the SO problem remains as stated in (11).
The inclusion of these additional constraints transforms the problem into a Generalized
Nash Equilibrium Problem. The goal is to ﬁnd a hedge tuple x∗ =( x∗,ν) such that x∗,ν
solves the problem of maximizing the risk valuation for each agent taking the hedging
strategies of the others as given. Any such tuple is called a Generalized Nash Equi-
librium(GNE). It is well known (e.g. Harker (1991)) that General Nash Equilibrium
Problems (GNEP) can be formulated as Quasi Variational Inequality problems(QVI).
18These may have multiple or possibly inﬁnitely many solutions. This lack of uniqueness
is often interpreted as a serious diﬃculty that has limited the usefulness of the concept
as GNE. For this reason it has often been criticized by economists as a plausible solution
concept of a meaningful game. We take a quite diﬀerent position and note that the
multiplicity of solutions reﬂects a fundamental feature of a market aﬀected by liquidity
problems. Illiquidity is a market failure and the indeterminate outcome of the market is
a consequence of that market failure. With this remark in mind and given our practical
objective of illustrating the impact of the liquidity constraints on the equilibrium, we aim
at ﬁnding a large set of GNEs in order to assess the type of ineﬃciency that illiquidity
can lead to.
From a mathematical point of view, our model is a GNEP with shared constraints
(Rosen (1965); Fukushima (2008)), meaning that the liquidity constraint bears on all
market agents. This special class of problems has received increasing attention in re-
cent years. Unlike the NEP, there are only few methods available to compute GNEP.
Recently, Nabetani et al. (2008) introduced two algorithms based on parametrized VIs
related to the GNEP which, under a mild constraint qualication, allow one to ﬁnd all
solutions of the GNEP. Fukushima (2008) also presents a new solution concept called
restricted GNE and proposes a heuristic control penalty algorithm to ﬁnd them. In this
paper, we use the method presented in Nabetani et al. (2008) based on price-directed
parametrization. We randomly sample on the players shadow prices in order to obtain
diﬀerent solutions. We compute up to 4000 equilibria for each case. The exact procedure
is explained in appendix E.
4.1. Illiquidity and arbitrage
Arbitrage opportunities are more likely to persist over time in illiquid markets. These
result from the diﬃculties confronted by arbitrageurs to exploit mispricing. For example,
Deville and Riva (2007) show for the case of option markets that arbitrages are tempo-
rary but that the speed of reversion to the no arbitrage situation is critically impacted by
liquidity-linked variables. Perfect liquidity and unconstrained portfolio formation are key
hypothesis to sustain the fundamental no-arbitrage assumption that most asset pricing
19theories rely upon17.
This paper suggests that modeling illiquidity by shared constraints on tradable vol-
umes implies that the obtained equilibrium solutions may contain arbitrage opportuni-
ties, regardless of the risk valuation used to model agents risk aversion. Indeed, one can
show that using a coherent and ”equivalent” risk valuation, the optimality condition of







c is the shadow price associated with the illiquidity constraint. In a
GNEP, this shadow price can diﬀer by agents. These arbitrage opportunities may exist
in equilibria when the volume constraints are tight and when all agents are not able to
hedge up to the desired level (i.e. ∀ν,λν
c ￿= 0). No one can exploit the remaining ar-
bitrage as the volume constraint is tight . This is the market failure induced by illiquidity.
4.2. Market simulations
We impose two liquidity constraints, one on the volume of energy futures, the other
on the volume of FTRs. Those liquidity bounds can be justiﬁed by several factors. The
peculiarities of transmission contracts is certainly an important one when it comes to
FTRs. First this market is indeed organized through an auction which, because of the
physical feasibility restriction imposed by the SO, limits liquidity18. Secondly the number
of agents at each node is limited. Siddiqui et al. (2005) Adamson and Englander (2005)
pointed the high risk premium of the FTRs and that the low liquidity of FTRs markets
is one major explanation. For the case of Europe some power derivatives contracts are
not purely ﬁnancial and hence are by construction physically limited19 .
17Recently, the theory has been adapted to tackle assets which dynamics changes with the order
balance. C ¸etin et al. (2004) extend the fundamental theorems of ﬁnance and show that the no-arbitrage
condition still implies the existence of a risk neutral measure, but that the perfect hedging, even for
complete market, does not hold anymore. One diﬃculty of applying the model is to quantify correctly
the asset’s dynamics with respect to the level of liquidity.
18There exist yet a secondary market, not regulated by the SO, where one can trade those contracts
through bilateral contract.
19For example, PHELIX futures traded on the European Energy Exchange (EEX) a physical delivery.
This is clearly a barrier for external speculators.
20We set the liquidity constraints on energy futures as a fraction of the expected total
power produced on the spot market. For the FTRs, this liquidity constraint is ﬁxed to a
share of the total point to hub capacities. For a ﬁrst scenario (noted LIQ66%), we assume
that the total of futures contracted at the hub does not exceed 66% of the expected total
production and the FTR’s volume is limited by the total capacity of the transmission
lines (summed over all lines of the grid). For a second scenario (noted LIQ33%), those

































































Table 6: Computed intervals for equilibria prices and volume of derivatives contracts)
Table (6) shows the range of contract prices and volumes found at equilibrium. These
ranges grow with the illiquidity sometimes leading to equilibria where the sign of the risk
premium changes compared to the perfect liquid case. Tables (10) and (11) in appendix
C show important statistics of the proﬁt in the diﬀerent equilibria. The agents proﬁt
distribution can be severely impacted by insuﬃcient liquidity. As can be seen from the
two scenarios studied, it may happen that each agent is excluded from the ﬁnancial
trading. This corresponds to the worst hedging situation. Also, as the liquidity falls, the








(and obviously the volume) shrinks to a value
closer to the spot. Figures of the proﬁt’s cumulative distribution function in table 12
indicates how the proﬁt of retailer at the hub is impacted by the illiquidity.
4.3. Interdependence between transmission and energy markets
Surprisingly, the liquidity of the energy futures market is not always binding. Indeed,
because of the limited number of FTRs, players can not really hedge proﬁts, which es-
sentially depend on the spot price at their home node. If they can not purchase those
21FTRs, they have less incentive to take futures positions at the hub. The incredibly low
volume of 17MW is achieved when all Northern players are unable to buy any FTRs.
This interdependence between the energy and transmission markets is revealed in a




















0 152 (22%) 54.8
Table 7: Induced energy futures volume for a given liquidity bounds on FTRs
striking way in Table 7. It shows the maximum (over all computed GNEs) volume of
energy futures as a function of the bound (illiquidity) of FTRs. One clearly sees the
reduced incentive of agents to enter energy futures position when the illiquidity of the
FTR market increases. In the extreme situation, when no transmission market exists,
the volume of energy futures drops to 152 MW. One also notes that the maximal energy
futures price tends to be higher. This reﬂects the fact that producers, not located at
the hub, demand higher expected returns on the energy future, as they can less perfectly
hedge their proﬁt (which depends highly on the congestion costs because of the lack of
FTRs).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the impact of insuﬃcient liquidity on the pricing
through an equilibrium based model. The problem is formulated as a Generalized Nash
Equilibrium problem and the solution is not unique. Computing a large panel of solutions,
we show that insuﬃcient liquidity can dramatically impact the agents proﬁt distribution
and that the risk premium may be more important in illiquid market. We show that
equilibrium models without speculation may have residual arbitrage opportunities and
identify two reasons why this is so. One is related to the notion of coherent risk valuation.
20The percentage of volume with respect to the expected quantities contracted in the spot market
22Modeling risk aversion through non coherent and equivalent risk valuation may lead to
arbitrage opportunities. These can be eliminated by allowing speculators in the market.
The second one is intrinsic to illiquidity and corresponds a market failure. Lack of
liquidity may create arbitrage opportunities. Through this paper, we rely on a deﬁnition
of illiquidity based on the volume. We leave to future research to explore the impact of
other measures such as bid-ask spread.
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A. Complementary ﬁgures and tables
Category Oil Natural Gas Coal Electricity
Physical





Wholesale Buyers + 3216
21 +7 3 2 5
20
Volume 7.6B barrels 22B MMBtu 1.1B short tons 3.8B MWh
(Physical) ($22B) ($152B) ($22 B) ($152 B)
Price Volatility 11% 29% 6% 66%














































1 [2116 , 2226] [1.8% , 22%] [1509 , 2160] [1 , 712]
2 [1220 , 1315] [3.1% , 37%] [697 , 1260] [0 , 551]
3 [628 , 743] [27% , 75%] [−83 , 444] [0 , 656]
4 [334 , 441] [14% , 79%] [−33 , 316] [17, 363]
5 [1583 , 1814] [44% , 76%] [78 , 711] [0, 590]
6 [1860 , 2502] [41% , 48%] [599 , 1003] [113, 677]














1 [2197 , 2960] [5% , 24%] [1480 , 2775] [0 , 546]
2 [1300 , 1973] [2% , 48%] [614 , 1905] [0 , 485]
3 [652 , 1173] [37% , 76%] [−83 , 418] [0 , 198]
4 [332 , 921] [13% , 250%] [−145 , 370] [0, 426]
5 [1577 , 2210] [42% , 76%] [78 , 838] [0, 571]
6 [1853 , 2655] [38% , 87%] [−308 , 1254] [0, 541]
Table 11: Producers and retailers proﬁts for LIQ33%
25Table 12: Range for the cumulative distribution function of the proﬁt of for the retailer located at the
hub (left : LIQ66%,r i g h t :L I Q 33%)
B. Risk-valuation and coherence
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space (equipped with a sigma algebra F and a prob-
ability measure P), Z := Lp(Ω,F,P) be the set of all F -measurable functions Z such
that
￿
Ω |Z(ω)|pdP(ω) < ∞. A risk valuation is a function ρ(Z) which maps Z into ¯ R.
In the context of maximization of a risk measure of an random reward , it is said that a
risk valuation is coherent if it satisﬁes the following axioms.
- Concavity: ρ(tZ1 +( 1− t)Z2) ≥ tρ(Z1)+( 1− t)ρ(Z2) ∀Z1,Z 2 ∈Z,∀t ∈ [0,1]
- Monotonicity: If Z1,Z 2 ∈Zand Z1 ￿ Z2,t h e nρ(Z1) ≥ ρ(Z2)
- Translation equivariance: If a ∈ R and Z ∈Z,t h e nρ(Z + a)=ρ(Z)+a
- Positive homogeneity: If t>0 and Z ∈Z,t h e nρ(tZ)=tρ(Z)
26C. Formulation and computation of the future equilibrium without liquidity
constraints
Following Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) who show how the CVaR could be cast in















s.t: Uν,ω ≥ 0










Applying the standard duality theory, one can convert the utility optimization problem
of the agents into the following optimality conditions. Equations 17-19 deﬁne the optimal
value of the state prices ζν,ω for all agents (i.e. retailers, producers and SO).
0 ≤ Uν,ω ⊥ βνα−1
ν +( 1− βν) − ζν,ω ≥ 0 (17)
0 ≤ ζν,ω − (1 − βν) ⊥ Uν











Equations 20-21 impose that the SO’s forward strategy satisﬁes the rule of N-1.
0 ≤ µ
+















c − K￿ ≥ 0 (21)



























27One can see from complementarity conditions (18) that the resulting Nash Equilibrium
Problem is non convex. We propose an heuristic to compute it by a sequential joint max-
imization method. Suppose that the equilibrium prices Pf
c are known. One can compute
the optimal strategies by solving the following linear problem (where Pf



































c =0 ( ηc)
The Karush-Kunh-Tucker optimality conditions of Elp are similar to the original NEP
except that Pf
c is replaced by Pf
c and that equality (22) and (23) are changed to:
Pf




















One see that when the dual variables ηc are all equal to zero (i.e. given the derivatives
prices, no agent have incentive to modify its portfolio), then the solution of Elp is also
solution of the Nash Equilibrium. This lead to the following heuristic algorithm.
Require: δ>0, Pf
c ∈ Rc
1: while ￿ ≥ δ do




4: ￿ = ||ηc||
5: end while
D. Non-coherent risk measure
While mean-variance have been probably the most used risk function for modeling
risk aversion, it is not coherent and, in the context of pricing, it may lead to solution
28with arbitrage opportunities. This is highlighted by the following example. Consider a
market with 2 goods. The price of those goods are denoted (ps
1,p s
2), which depend on
the state s of the world. We consider 3 possible state, each having a probability φs to
occur. There is a ﬁnancial market where futures contract on those goods are traded.





s = sc1 s = sc2 s = sc3




2 1 2 3.5
There are 2 agents yielding a stochastic proﬁt (πs
a,πs
b) depending on s. The proﬁt of
agent a is positively aﬀected by good 1 and negatively by good 2. The proﬁt of agent b
is inversely impacted.
s = sc1 s = sc2 s = sc3
πs
a 45 31.67 50
πs








Agents are risk averse and their utility is modeled by a mean-variance as risk measure










They trade future in order to maximize this risk measure. Intuitively, a, giving his
stochastic proﬁt, have incentive to sell future 1 and buy future 2 and inversely for agent
b.






















The equilibrium solution are reported in the next Table. One can see that this solution
29contains arbitrage opportunities22. Indeed, there exist no equivalent risk-neutral prob-
ability measure. Graphically, futures prices do not belong strictly to the convex hull of
spot prices.







22Numerically, the strategy qf =( −1,0.5) is an arbitrage opportunity. Notice that, as ﬁnancial
contracts are futures, the payments are due at maturity.
30E. Formulation and computation of the future equilibrium with liquidity con-
straints















s.t: Uν,ω ≥ 0






















c ≤ Lc (λν
c)
(30)
The complementary conditions of this problem are quite similar to the previous prob-










c ≥ 0 (32)
0 ≤ λν






















31As the shared constraints are separable, we compute the diﬀerent GNE using the
parametrized Variational Inequality approaches described in Nabetani et al. (2008). We
construct a family of VIs that contains all the equilibria of the initial GNEP. We perturb










We then compute the associate NEP, using the heuristic developed in appendix C. Ac-









c) = 0 (37)
32Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2009/53.  David DE LA CROIX and Frédéric DOCQUIER. An incentive mechanism to break the low-
skill immigration deadlock. 
2009/54.  Henry TULKENS and Vincent VAN STEENBERGHE. "Mitigation, adaptation, suffering": In 
search of the right mix in the face of climate change. 
2009/55.  Santanu S. DEY and Quentin LOUVEAUX. Split rank of triangle and quadrilateral inequalities. 
2009/56.  Claire DUJARDIN, Dominique PEETERS and Isabelle THOMAS. Neighbourhood effects and 
endogeneity issues. 
2009/57.  Marie-Louise LEROUX, Pierre PESTIEAU and Maria RACIONERO. Voting on pensions: sex 
and marriage. 
2009/58.  Jean J. GABSZEWICZ. A note on price competition in product differentiation models. 
2009/59.  Olivier BOS and Martin RANGER. All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards. 
2009/60.  Julio DAVILA and Marie-Louise LEROUX. On the fiscal treatment of life expectancy related 
choices.  
2009/61.  Luc  BAUWENS  and  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS.  On  marginal  likelihood  computation  in 
change-point models. 
2009/62.  Jorge ALCALDE-UNZU and Elena MOLIS. Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: 
the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms. 
2009/63.  Pascal MOSSAY and Pierre M. PICARD. On spatial equilibria in a social interaction model. 
2009/64.  Laurence JACQUET and Dirk VAN DE GAER. A comparison of optimal tax policies when 
compensation or responsibility matter. 
2009/65.  David DE LA CROIX and Clara DELAVALLADE. Why corrupt governments may receive 
more foreign aid. 
2009/66.  Gilles GRANDJEAN, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Strongly rational 
sets for normal-form games. 
2009/67.  Kristian BEHRENS, Susana PERALTA and Pierre M. PICARD. Transfer pricing rules, OECD 
guidelines, and market distortions. 
2009/68.  Marco  MARINUCCI  and  Wouter  VERGOTE.  Endogenous  network  formation  in  patent 
contests and its role as a barrier to entry. 
2009/69.  Andréas  HEINEN  and  Alfonso  VALDESOGO.  Asymmetric  CAPM  dependence  for  large 
dimensions: the Canonical Vine Autoregressive Model. 
2009/70.  Skerdilajda  ZANAJ.  Product  differentiation  and  vertical  integration  in  presence  of  double 
marginalization. 
2009/71.  Marie-Louise  LEROUX  and  Grégory  PONTHIERE.  Wives,  husbands  and  wheelchairs: 
Optimal tax policy under gender-specific health. 
2009/72.  Yu.  NESTEROV  and  Levent  TUNCEL.  Local  quadratic  convergence  of  polynomial-time 
interior-point methods for conic optimization problems. 
2009/73.  Grégory  VANDENBULCKE,  Claire  DUJARDIN,  Isabelle  THOMAS,  Bas  DE  GEUS,  Bart 
DEGRAEUWE,  Romain  MEEUSEN  and  Luc  INT  PANIS.  Cycle  commuting  in  Belgium: 
Spatial determinants and 're-cycling' strategies. 
2009/74.  Noël BONNEUIL and Raouf BOUCEKKINE. Sustainability, optimality, and viability in the 
Ramsey model. 
2009/75.  Eric TOULEMONDE. The principle of mutual recognition – A source of divergence? 
2009/76.  David  DE  LA  CROIX,  Pierre  PESTIEAU  and  Grégory  PONTHIÈRE.  How  powerful  is 
demography? The Serendipity Theorem revisited. 
2009/77.  Nicola ACOCELLA, Giovanni DI BARTOLOMEO, Andrew HUGUES HALLETT and Paolo 
G. PIACQUADIO. Announcement wars as an equilibrium selection device. 
2009/78.  Julio DÁVILA. The taxation of savings in overlapping generations economies with unbacked 
risky assets. 
2009/79.  Elena DEL REY and Miguel Angel LOPEZ-GARCIA. Optimal education and pensions in an 
endogenous growth model. 
 Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2009/80.  Hiroshi UNO. Strategic complementarities and nested potential games. 
2009/81.  Xavier WAUTHY. Market coverage and the nature of product differentiation: a note. 
2009/82.  Filippo L.  CALCIANO. Nash equilibria of games with increasing best replies. 
2009/83.  Jacques H. DRÈZE, Oussama LACHIRI and Enrico MINELLI. Stock prices, anticipations and 
investment in general equilibrium. 
2009/84.  Claire  DUJARDIN  and  Florence  GOFFETTE-NAGOT.  Neighborhood  effect  on 
unemployment? A test à la Altonji. 
2009/85.  Erwin OOGHE and Erik SCHOKKAERT. School accountability: (how) can we reward schools 
and avoid cream-skimming. 
2009/86.  Ilke VAN BEVEREN and Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE. Product and process innovation and the 
decision to export: firm-level evidence for Belgium. 
2010/1.  Giorgia  OGGIONI  and  Yves  SMEERS.  Degree  of  coordination  in  market-coupling  and 
counter-trading. 
2010/2.  Yu.  NESTEROV.  Efficiency  of  coordinate  descent  methods  on  huge-scale  optimization 
problems. 
2010/3.  Geert DHAENE an Koen JOCHMANS. Split-panel jackknife estimation of fixed-effect models. 
2010/4.  Parkash CHANDER. Cores of games with positive externalities. 





Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition: 22 selected papers in public economics by 
Henry Tulkens, edited and introduced by Parkash Chander, Jacques Drèze, C. Knox Lovell and 
Jack Mintz, Springer, Boston 2006 (588 pp.). 
V.  GINSBURGH  and  D.  THROSBY  (eds.)  (2006),  Handbook  of  the  economics  of  art  and  culture. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
J. GABSZEWICZ (ed.) (2006), La différenciation des produits. Paris, La découverte. 
L. BAUWENS, W. POHLMEIER and D. VEREDAS (eds.) (2008), High frequency financial econometrics: 
recent developments. Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag. 
P. VAN HENTENRYCKE and L. WOLSEY (eds.) (2007), Integration of AI and OR techniques in constraint 
programming for combinatorial optimization problems. Berlin, Springer. 
P-P.  COMBES,  Th.  MAYER  and  J-F.  THISSE  (eds.)  (2008),  Economic  geography:  the  integration  of 
regions and nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (ed.) (2008), Au-delà de Copernic: de la confusion au consensus ? Brussels, Academic and 
Scientific Publishers. 
J-M. HURIOT and J-F. THISSE (eds) (2009), Economics of cities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
C. GOURIÉROUX and A. MONFORT (1995), Simulation Based Econometric Methods. 
A. RUBINSTEIN (1996), Lectures on Modeling Bounded Rationality. 
J. RENEGAR (1999), A Mathematical View of Interior-Point Methods in Convex Optimization. 
B.D.  BERNHEIM  and  M.D.  WHINSTON  (1999),  Anticompetitive  Exclusion  and  Foreclosure  Through 
Vertical Agreements. 
D.  BIENSTOCK  (2001),  Potential  function  methods  for  approximately  solving  linear  programming 
problems: theory and practice. 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 